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Firm Investment Decisions, Dividend 
Policy, And Director Stock Options 





Since risk plays a role in setting dividend policy and granting stock options to directors, the paper 
investigates the effect of director compensation structure on the riskiness of the firm’s investment 
strategy by examining the firm’s dividend payout policy. The results imply that stock options to 
outside directors increase the firm’s appetite for risk and suggest that director stock options 
constitute a major incentive to changing corporate policies. The results also indicate that director 
stock options align the risk preferences of managers and directors. Finally, the results suggest 
that stock options do not motivate directors to act opportunistically in setting investment and 
payout policies.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
revious research suggests that stock option compensation provides a motive to increase risk taking. 
Thus, top executives and directors who receive a significant amount of their pay in the form of stock 
options are likely to change investment policies of the firms they control. Fich and Shivdasani (2005) 
find a positive correlation between director stock option plans and market to book ratio and the cumulative abnormal 
return suggesting a relation between director compensation and the firm’s investment plans. These arguments 
prompt the question whether the change in director compensation structure is affecting a fundamental change in the 
role of directors in the firm. 
 
In this paper, we complement previous studies by providing further evidence on the effect of director 
option compensation on the advisory role of directors in financing and investment decisions. Indeed, the board 
assumes direct responsibility in various coporate decisions such as asset sales, takeover attempts, and payout 
policy.
1
 Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasize the advisory role of outside directors while Bhagat and Black (2002) 
suggest that directors’ experience and expertise affect firm performance. Empirically, Harford (2003) finds a 
relation between governance structure and takeover attempts and outcomes. John and Knyazeva (2006) and Jiraporn 
and Chintrakarn (2009) find a significant relation between various governance measures and payout policy. Thus, 
we conjecture that the recent development in director compensation structure might have an effect on the director’s 
advisory role; in particular, a relation may exist between director stock option grants and the firm’s financing and 
investment decisions.  
 
To examine the advisory role of outside directors, I focus on corporate payout decisions. Certainly, not 
paying dividends or reducing dividends (in dividend-paying firms) may be a way to raise capital for potential 
investments. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find a significant relation between the propensity to pay dividend and risk. 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find that dividend paying firms are less risky than non-paying firms. 
Smith and Watts (1992) point out a high correlation between financing and compensation activity. In fact, they posit 
that firms with high growth opportunities pay low dividends and high incentive-based management compensation. 
Their argument is supportive to the contracting hypothesis; i.e., dividend payout and compensation are internally 
determined by management and board negotiation and not price motivated. Further, Guay (1999) finds that stock 
option compensation improves the option holder’s appetite for risk. Thus, since firm risk is a common factor 
affecting the distribution of internal funds and granting of director stock options, we examine whether granting stock 
                                                 
1 See Delaware General Corporate Law § 141(c). 
P 
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options to outside directors tend to reduce the level of distribution of internal funds in order to increase investments. 
I call this hypothesis the risk enhancing hypothesis.  
 
We also examine whether stock options to outside directors motivate opportunistic behavior. Basically, do 
stock options for outside directors motivate self dealing? We argue that if directors act opportunistically then firm 
value would be affected. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) point outthat executive stock options are unprotected against 
dividend and that executives reduce dividend to preserve the value of their options. We posit the same argument 
regarding outside directors. Finally, we check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of CEO stock options 
as a factor in determining payout and investment policy. 
 
In summary, the research question presented in this paper is whether the cumulative effect of director stock 
options has bearing on the firm’s financing and investment decisions. Realizing that such decisions are part of a long 
term strategy, we examine the change in the strategy over a five year period. Particularly, we investigate whether 
paying incentive compensation for directors over several periods until they establish an equity stake in the firm 
would eventually affect the company’s long-term payout policy. We expect that a long term incentive compensation 
policy accompanies a reduction in total payout (i.e. decrease in dividend and repurchases). We also study whether 
the reduction in the total payout is a consequence of an increase in risk taking behavior (risk enhancing hypothesis). 
Further, the structural change in director compensation also necessitates probing the relation between outside 
directors and the CEO of the firm. 
 
Using panel data over the period 1995-2006 we find that stock option compensation for outside directors 
provide incentives to increase the riskiness of the investment strategy. In particular, if stock options increase the 
convexity of the directors’ utility function and subsequently their tolerance for risk, then dividends (low risk) should 
be lower in firms that have potential investments and even lower when director compensation contracts are rich in 
stock options. Consistent with the risk enhancing argument, we find that firms with high research and development 
expense and market to book ratio have even lower payout ratio when directors receive more stock options. We 
interpret these results to suggest that firms paying stock options to outside directors have greater appetite for risk 
that manifest in its financing and investment policies. 
 
Second, I examine whether directors opportunistically reduce payout. If director stock options are inversely 
related to the distribution of dividends, then it may be that the reduction of cash disbursement is to promote personal 
interests- negative net present value projects. Another possibility is that directors may collude with management if 
stock options align the interest of both. We present evidence that firms that overinvest (Market to Book (M/B)<1) do 
not reduce the distribution of dividends when directors receive stock options, whereas value-maximizing firms 
(M/B>=1) do. This result supports the hypothesis that director stock options improve the efficacy of the board rather 
than promote opportunistic behavior. Finally, we enter CEO stock options in the analysis to ascertain that the results 
continue to hold. 
 
The study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the analysis provides support to the 
notion that stock options to outside directors motivate aggressive investment strategies. Second, the study highlights 
the point that stock options to outside directors and to executives may have the same effect on the firm’s payout and 
investment policy. Third, the paper suggests that director stock options constitute a major incentive to changing 
corporate policies. Finally, the outcome implies that since incentive compensation alters financing, investment and 
governance plans within the firm, regulatory agencies should consider director compensation when issuing mandates 
and quotas on board composition. 
 
2  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that reputation is the main incentive for outside directors. Other researchers 
focus on board composition and ownership as underlying factors for enhancing board effectiveness. For example, 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) find that independency of the board is negatively related to the cost of financing. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe higher abnormal returns around announcement dates for bidding firms where the 
board constitutes more than 50% outsiders, suggesting that outside directors are involved in strategic investment 
decisions. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  755 
Compensation contracts are commonly used to align the interests of management and shareholders. 
Similarly, director compensation contracts have become more incentive–based in order to align the interests of 
directors (wealth and risk) and shareholders. However, because director pay is assumed to be small relative to CEO 
pay, previous literature devotes little attention to the relation between director compensation and effectiveness of the 
board. For example, Harford (2003) studies a sample of firms subject to hostile takeover attempts over the period 
1988 and 1991 and concludes that financial benefits to outside directors is relatively small to affect board takeover 
decisions. However, Yermack (2004) argues that director compensation contracts have become a significant factor 
in affecting board decisions. Most importantly, the recent development in the structure of director compensation 
raises concerns whether stock options motivate directors to be more involved in firm operations.  
 
The main question in this paper is whether stock options to outside directors affect the firm’s investment 
and payout decisions. The argument is based on the assumption that compensation contracts are optimally designed 
to achieve two objectives: attract qualified directors and motivate them to fulfill their jobs. Therefore, the study uses 
the proportion of stock options (PSO) in director’s total compensation to investigate whether structural differences 
in compensation contracts have effects on directors’ diligence on the board. 
 
2.1  Risk enhancing hypothesis 
 
Rosen (1982) suggests that executive compensation is tied to firm value by firm size and the complexity of 
the job. Further, executive incentive compensation, specifically stock options, is thought to align executive wealth 
with that of shareholders and to align the risk preferences of shareholders and executives.
2
 Indeed, corporate 
executives have most of their human capital invested in the firm and thus become risk-averse; whereas well-
diversified shareholders (i.e. caring only about systematic risk) have interest in the firm taking on riskier projects 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Guay, 1999). Therefore, firms with stock option rich compensation for outside directors 
will tend to retain higher levels of excess cash for future investments. 
 
Dividends reduce cash reserves that are used for future investments. According to the pecking order 
hypothesis (Myers, 1984), internally generated funds are preferred to external financing and therefore firms 
expecting future investments will favor lower dividends. Supporting the pecking order, Fama and French (2002) 
document lower dividends for firms with abundant investment opportunities. Similarly, Gaver and Gaver (1993), 
using a multivariate measure of investment opportunity, provide evidence that growth firms distribute less dividends 
than non-growth firms. Recently, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) argue that firms adopting stock option plans for 
outside directors have higher market to book. In addition, Guay and Harford (2000) relate the use of dividends to the 
stability of firms’ earnings, suggesting that dividend distribution depends on the availability of cash for future 
investments.
3
 I use the relation between dividends and research and development expense (R&D) and market to 
book (M/B) to proxy for investment planning because if potential investments (R&D) are anticipated then dividends 
are reduced and if earnings are expected (M/B) dividends may be distributed. As such, under the risk enhancing 
hypotesis firms may distribute even lower dividends when investments (or earnings) are anticipated because of the 
preference for investment (risky) over dividends (safe bets). 
 
2.2  Opportunistic behavior 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are motivated by reputation concerns to fulfill their 
duties. However, if pursuing their own objectives promises higher financial rewards, outside directors may attempt 
to change the firm’s strategies to serve their personal interests. This might take two forms: investments in 
suboptimal projects that benefit outside directors and/or collusion of directors and managers to extract perquisites. 
For example, Vafeas (1999) finds that the adoption of director stock option plans is associated with an increase in 
retirement plans for outside directors, which he interprets as opportunistic behavior. Brick, Palmon and Wald 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of how stock options align risk preferences see Smith and Stulz (1985), and Guay (1999). 
3 Seemingly counter arguments for the relation between dividends and investment opportunities are presented under the signaling 
hypothesis of dividends. The signaling hypothesis postulates a positive relation between dividends and future earnings. For 
theoretical presentation of this argument see Battacharya (1979) and see Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) for empirical 
evidence. 
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(2006), after examining the compensation of managers and directors, argue that the two groups collude with each 
other to promote their mutual interests rather than the interests of shareholders.  
 
Thus, are director stock options a reflection of director influence? Are director stock options accompanied 
by opportunistic behavior by outside directors? In other words, influential directors may take on projects that 
increase their personal benefits even if they destroy firm wealth. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) argue that taking 
suboptimal investments to extract private benefits appears in firm value. Thus, I test whether stock option 
compensation for outside directors is associated with lower dividends in undervalued firms. 
 
2.3  CEO effect 
 
Although dividend payout decision is in the hands of directors (Delaware General Corporate Law article 
104 (c)) CEOs are most influential in determining the firm’s investment decisions that effectively relate to 
distribution of dividends. It is thus understandable that outside directors share with the CEO the decision to 
distribute dividends. Indeed, part of the indirect effect that stock options generate is the increase in the tendency of 
the option holder to take on more risk. CEOs and directors receiving stock options have incentives to increase firm 
investments and reduce dividends; assuming dividends are low-risk projects. In other words, similar to directors, 
CEOs might support lower dividends when the firm has abundant investment opportunities. Brick, Palmon and Wald 
(2006) argue that director and CEO compensation are positively related suggesting that the two entities collude to 
provide mutual benefits.  Therefore, I hypothesize that firms granting stock options to their CEOs are expected to 
distribute even lower dividends when firms invest in R&D and have high market to book. In addition, we are 
interested to see whether the CEO’s effect over shadows the effect of directors in the firm. 
 
3  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
Our empirical approach comprises two parts: univariate and multivariate analysis. In the univariate 
analysis: first, we split the sample into dividend-paying and non-paying firms; then into low and high dividend-
paying firms. Low and high dividend-paying firms are split by the median of dividend payout in dividend-paying 
firms. Second, we split the sample by the median of M/B and the median of R&D. Before we display our tests we 
introduce the attribute measures, the data and sample selection criteria, and the descriptive statistics.  
 
3.1  Attribute measures 
 
To conduct the empirical tests weusedividend payout as the dependent variable. Our aim is to examine the 
investment and payout policies in firms that follow different compensation structure for outside directors. Thus, 
director stock option compensation is used as the main independent variable to affect dividend payout. Other 
independent variables are used as proxies for dividend strategy and control variables. In addition, interaction 
variables are also used to reflect the extent of director involvement. 
 
3.1.1  Dividends 
 
Previous literature uses dividend yield (dividend over stock price) to examine the payout policy (e.g. Fenn 
and Liang, 2001). However, in this paper we use dividend to assets (Div2A) as a proxy for the payout policy. Fama 
and French (2002) point out that the ratio of dividend to assets may explain more about dividend policy than 
dividend to price ratio because the variation in the latter measure is due mostly to changes in the stock price. In 
some instances, we test the hypotheses using two other proxies: 1- the change in dividends over total assets by using 
the lagged variable as an independent variable and 2- payout ratio that is calculated as dividend over earnings before 
extra ordinary items. The latter measure suffers from high drop out of data for firms with zero or negative income. 
Other related variables used are stock repurchases over total assets (Repo2A) and the sum of dividends and 
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3.1.2  Director and CEO characteristics 
 
The main hypothesis in this paper is whether stock option compensation for outside directors affects board 
decisions. The reason stock options for outside directors did not take considerable share in previous literature is 
because it is small relative to CEO stock options. However, studies by Vafeas (1999) and Yermack (2004) argue that 
the effect of these grants is significant if they occur over several years. Therefore, in this paper we use our 
compensation variables as five years cumulative. Specifically, we use two proxies for director incentive pay (Dir 
Inc); namely director proportion of stock options (Dir PSO) and director pay for performance (PyPerDir). Dir PSO 
is the sum of the value of stock options accumulated over five years as a fraction of total director compensation. 
PyPerDir is the natural logarithm of a dollar change in the five years cumulative stock option compensation for a 
one percentage change in stock price. Total director compensation is the sum of fixed salary, meeting fees, and total 
value of stock and stock option grants accumulated over five years. Similarly, for CEO incentive pay (CEO Inc), 
weuse the same approach to calculate CEO proportion of stock options (CEO PSO) and CEO pay for performance 
(PyPerCEO). However, instead of accumulating stock options over five years we add stock grants with unexercised 
exercisable stock options. Since both director and CEO proportion of stock options are considered as incentives to 
induce risk taking, they are likely to be negatively related to dividend distribution.  
 
In addition, the model controls for director stock ownership (Dir Own) and CEO stock ownership (CEO 
Own).Ownership variables are calculated as the number of stock held divided by total shares outstanding. Stock 
ownership is a factor in reducing agency problems in the firm because it aligns the interests of the option holder and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, stock ownership is inversely related to dispersion of 
ownership and consequently negatively related to agency costs (Rozeff, 1982). In this view, CEO and director 
ownership are expected to be negatively related to dividends if dividends are agency control mechanisms.  . 
 
To incorporate the role of stock options as an agency control mechanism we include several governance 
variables in our multivariate tests. We include board structure variables: board size (Board) as logarithm of the 
number of directors on the board and proportion of outside directors on the board (Outsiders). Since dividend payout 
is a board decision, the power of outsiders on the board might affect the payout decision. We also include CEO 
entrenchment variables: CEO chair (CEOChair) is a dummy that equals one if the CEO also holds the title of chair 
of the board. Tenure is the number of years the CEO held his/her position. CEOs that also hold board chairs and 
CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to be entrenched and thus are less likely to advocate lower dividends. 
Hence, we expect CEO chair and tenure to be negatively related to dividend payout variables. 
 
3.1.3  Firm characteristics 
 
The regressions also include firm size, risk, return, leverage and industry and year dummies as control 
variables. Firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. The larger the firm, the more predictable are its 
future prospects (low volatility of returns and cash flows) and the more access it has to the capital market. Therefore, 
we expect a positive relation between size and dividends.  
 
Firm performance (Return) and risk (Risk) are also included as explanatory variables. Return is calculated 
as the previous year average monthly return. Return is a market measure and might suggest that riskier firms have 
higher returns and also pay low dividends. Market return, in fact, reflects the future potential of the firm so it is 
expected that return to be negatively related to the level of dividends while positively related to changes in dividend.  
Firm risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly return over the year is included. Firms with high 
variability in performance tend to lower payout.  
 
In addition, firms that hold high amount of cash are more likely to distribute dividends. Therefore, we 
include cash excess cash (XS cash) as a control variable. XS cash is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation less capital expenditure divided by total assets.This variable is expected to relate positively to dividend 
payout. Leverage, measured as long term debt divided by total assets, is also added as an explanatory variable. Debt 
contracts often include covenants restricting the distribution of dividends. The direction of the relation between 
leverage and dividends is expected to be negative. Finally, industry dummies at the two digit SIC code are added to 
all models.  
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3.1.4  Proxies for dividend strategy  
 
Dividends can be part of an investment plan. Previous literature posits two arguments relating dividends to 
investments. The first, advocated by Myers (1984), assumes that external financing is costly and therefore firms with 
potential investments prefer retaining capital inside the firm rather than distributing it as dividends. The second 
argument is that dividend policy contains information about future investments. This argument is the basis for the 
signaling hypothesis which predicts that firms signal about potential investments (or earnings) by increasing 
dividends. To accommodate both arguments the model includes two proxies for investment opportunities: research 
and development expenses to total assets (R&D) and market to book (M/B). R&D is a forward looking variable 
since it signals the firm’s potential to generate future investments. High R&D firms are firms with high investment 
opportunities and greater need for cash. We expect dividends to be negatively related to R&D. M/B is market 
capitalization plus the book value of long-term debt over the book value of total assets. Firms that have high market 
values may be able to promise consistent levels of future payout (Guay and Harford, 2000) or need to signal about 
these opportunities in order to raise more capital in the future (Pan, 2007). On the other hand, high M/B firms are 
considered growth firms; in other words, high M/B may reflect future opportunities and subsequently more need for 
capital and thus lower dividends. The direction of the relation between M/B and dividend payout is undetermined. 
Research and Development to assets (R&D) is also included in the regression.  
 
3.1.5  Interaction variables 
 
The involvement of directors in setting the dividend policy is addressed by including interaction variables 
between director’s incentive compensation variables and the variables that proxy for dividend strategy (M/B and 
R&D). For example, since dividends are considered part of an investment plan, the interaction variables between 
director’s incentive variables and the two proxies for future investments are included. However, in order to better 
interpret the results we transform M/B and R&D to indicator variables. We use MB as an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if M/B is high – above the median- and zero otherwise. RD is also an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
R&D is above the median and zero otherwise. The risk enhancing hypothesis suggests that director stock options 
increase directors’ preference for investments over dividends. Hence, we expect a negative relation between the 
interaction variables of director’s incentive variables and M/B and the same with the interaction variable of director 
incentive pay and R&D.  
 
3.2  Data and sample  
 
The study starts with all firms listed on the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) between the 
years 1996 and 2005. IRRC provides data on director ownership and board structure. Then this data is matched to 
Execucomp. Execucomp provides data on the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400 and the S&P SmallCap 600 firms. It 
contains data on CEO stock options, total compensation and stock ownership. It also reports director total 
compensation, which is composed of a fixed salary, meeting fees, and an equity part (stock and stock option grants). 
However, director stock option compensation is listed in units, not in dollar values. So, we calculate stock option 
values for outside directors using Black-Scholes option pricing model with all variables obtained from Execucomp. 
The sample is then matched with financial data from Compustat and market data from CRSP. Firms that belong to 
the utility and financial industries are excluded; so are firms with incomplete data. Since explanatory variables are 
one year lag data for dividend are used for the years 1997 to 2006. The final sample comprises about 10419 firm-
years expanding 44 different industries. 
 
3.3  Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for selected variables. The average firm has total assets of about $13 
billion and M/B value of 1.99. It uses leverage of about 24% and shareholders earn a dividend yield of 1.33%. The 
average director receives $170 thousand in total annual compensation, 49% of which is stock options accumulated 
over five years. This number is biased downward since distributing stock options to outside directors is a recent 
trend. The CEO of the average firm, however, earns $4.8 million in total annual compensation. In addition, the 
typical CEO has 59% of total annual pay from stock options and in the money unexercised exercisable stock 
options. On average, the CEO owns about 2.26% of the firm’s outstanding shares whereas the director owns about 
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1.13%. Further, 56% of firm years in the sample have non-zero dividends. It is obvious from the descriptive 
statistics that stock options constitute a large fraction of director compensation. The significance of this phenomenon 





This table presents summary statistics for the variables over the period 1995 to 2006. The sample consists of all firms with data 
on COMPUSTAT, CRSP, IRRC and EXECUCOMP. Firms in the utilities and financial industries (SIC 4900-4999 and 6000-
6999) and firms with incomplete data are excluded. Dir PSO is the sum of the value of stock options accumulated over five years 
as a fraction of total director compensation. PyPerDir is the dollar change in total director compensation for a one percentage 
change in stock price. Total director compensation is the sum of fixed salary, meeting fees, and total value of stock and stock 
option grants accumulated over five years. CEO PSO and PyPerCEO are calculated similar to those of directors using 
unexercised exercisable stock options. Assets is the book value of total assets. M/B is the market capitalization plus the book 
value of long-term debt divided by the book value of the total assets. R&D is research and development expense as a percent of 
total assets. Leverage is the book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. XS Cash is operating income 
before depreciation less capital expenditure divided by book value of total assets. Ret and Risk are the mean and standard 
deviation of the monthly return over the year, respectively. Dir (CEO) Own is the number of shares outside directors (CEO) hold 
as a percent of total shares outstanding. CEOChair is a dummy that equals to one when the CEO holds the position of the chair of 
the board. Tenure is the number of years the CEO held the CEO position. Board is the number of directors on the board. 
Outsiders is the number of outside directors as a percent of the total directors on the board. 
Panel A Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Dividend/Assets (%) 1.14 0.46 2.13 0.00 58.04 
Dividend Yield (%) 1.33 0.72 2.11 0.00 68.97 
Leverage (%) 23.61 22.77 18.49 0.00 177.52 
M/B  1.99 1.50 1.67 0.28 78.56 
R&D (%) 2.64 0.00 6.06 0.00 165.05 
XS Cash (%) 2.43 3.79 14.44 -50.09 62.18 
Assets (Millions) 13223.30 1713.96 63811.93 0.00 1494037.00 
Ret (%) 1.14 1.10 3.62 -23.85 68.66 
Risk (%) 11.87 0.98 7.34 0.86 274.22 
Director Stock Options (000) 125.03 24.64 1185.69 0.00 115059.98 
Director Compensation (000) 169.39 78.14 1194.78 0.00 115059.98 
Dir PSO (%) 49.85 58.19 39.83 0.00 100.00 
PyPerDir (000)  6.53 1.77 23.86 0.00 1329.12 
CEO Stock Options (000) 2480.79 693.37 9952.11 0.00 600347.35 
CEO Total Compensation (000) 4795.89 2365.05 11115.01 0.00 600347.35 
CEO PSO (%) 59.78 68.12 30.98 0.00 100.00 
PyPerCEO (000) 256.86 94.10 572.33 0.00 20293.41 
Dir Own (%) 1.13 0.19 3.70 0.00 65.11 
CEO Own (%) 2.26 0.30 6.48 0.00 29.55 
Tenure 7.38 6.00 7.25 0.00 54.00 
CEOChair (%) 62.14 100.00 48.51 0.00 100.00 
Board  7.71 8.00 3.14 1.00 22.00 
Outside Directors 5.05 5.00 2.73 0.00 17.00 
Outsiders (%) 62.50 66.67 21.64 0.00 100.00 
Firms that Paid Dividends (%) 56%     
 
 
I calculate the correlation matrix of independent variables (not tabulated). Overall, the correlations between 
the independent variables do not suggest a serious multicollinearity problem. As expected the correlation between 
Dir PSO and Div2A is negative. The correlation Div2A and M/B is positive which is supportive of the signaling 
hypothesis. The correlation between Div2A and R&D is negative supporting the argument that firms with greater 
investment opportunities pay lower dividend. For robustness, the regressions are re-estimated (not shown) excluding 
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4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To test the above hypotheses we employ a univariate approach and a regression approach. The univariate 
analysis examines the differences in means of sub-samples divided according to the level of dividend distribution. In 
the multiple regression a Tobit model is used to test the relation between dividends and director stock option 
compensation. A Tobit approach is appropriate because dividends are clustered at zero with about 56% of the 
sample having non-zero dividends. 
 
4.1  Univariate analysis 
 
Panel A in table 2 compares means of several variables for dividend-paying firms with non-paying firms. 
The results provide preliminary support to the argument that stock option compensation to outside directors is 
associated with the decision to distribute dividends. For example, Dir PSO in dividend-paying firms is significantly 
less than that of the non-paying firms. Further, CEO compensation in dividend-paying firms is less stock option-
based than CEO compensation in non-paying firms. This may suggest that whether or not the company distributes 




Univariate Analysis for Dividend-paying Versus Non-Paying Firms and Low- Versus High- Dividend-paying Firms 
This table compares the means of the variables between groups of dividend paying and non paying firm and high and low 
dividend paying firms. High and low paying firms are categorized according to the median of dividend to assets of dividend 
paying firms. All explanatory variables descriptions are similar to those in table 1. * indicates that the difference is significant at 
5%. 
 Panel A  Panel B Median= 1.31 
 Div2A =0 Div2A>0 Div2A<1.31 Div2A≥1.31 
Dividend/Assets (%) 0.00 1.86* 0.63 3.09* 
Leverage (%) 21.44 24.93* 26.06 23.81* 
M/B  2.26 1.82* 1.47 2.17* 
R&D 4.65 1.36* 0.99 1.73* 
XS Cash (%) -0.48 4.38* 0.69 6.00* 
Assets (Millions) 2444.65 19793.68* 32597.72 6985.63* 
Ret (%) 1.50 0.98* 1.14 0.82* 
Risk (%) 15.06 9.20* 10.02 8.39* 
Director Stock Options (000) 245.02 48.53* 54.36 42.71* 
Director Compensation (000) 277.44 101.62* 104.84 98.40* 
Dir PSO (%) 67.48 38.61* 41.31 35.91* 
PyPerDir 11.39 3.45* 3.59 3.31 
CEO Stock Options (000) 3244.91 1993.61* 2179.23 1807.94* 
CEO Total Compensation (000) 4860.99 4754.43 5096.64 4411.58* 
CEO PSO (%) 65.75 55.98* 59.05 52.91* 
PyPerCEO 257.37 256.54 276.24 236.84* 
Dir Own 1.15 1.12 1.05 1.19 
CEO Own (%) 3.28 2.20* 2.41 2.00* 
Tenure 7.88 7.07* 7.57 6.56* 
CEOChair 57.80 64.90* 65.91 63.89 
Board  6.50 8.49* 8.55 8.42 
Outside Directors 4.00 5.72* 5.65 5.78 
Outsiders (%) 58.23 65.22* 63.53 66.91* 
N 4076 6393 3196 3197 
 
 
Obvious in the data is the structural difference between firms that pay dividends and firms that do 
not.
4
Growth firms, high M/B and high R&D firms do not distribute dividends. In addition, firms that do not pay 
                                                 
4Though not reported in the tables, it is worth noting that in our sample the percentage of firms distributing dividends has 
decreased from 61% in 1999 to 54% in 2001. 
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dividends are often smaller, use less leverage and carry less cash. The difference in firm characteristics between 
dividend-paying and non-paying firms suggests that firms with growth potential are reluctant to pay dividends 
whereas established large firms are motivated by their excess cash and limited growth opportunities to pay 
dividends. Similar results are reportedin Fama and French (2001). 
 
Panel B in table 2 reports statistics for firms that pay high dividends versus firms that pay low dividends. 
Dir PSO in high dividend-paying firms is significantly lower than that in low dividend-paying firms. Similarly, CEO 
PSO is significantly different between the two groups. M/B and R&D are significantly greater in high dividend-
paying firms which seem to contradict or original hypothesis. However, the difference in the M/B and R&D between 
dividend-paying and non-paying firms and that between high and low dividend-paying firms has two interpretations. 
On the one hand, low M/B may indicate overinvestment; whereby firms avoid dividends and invest in negative net 
present value projects.
5
 For instance, low M/B and high stock options to outside directors in low versus high 
dividend-paying firms supports the hypothesis that directors act opportunistically regarding the distribution of 
dividends. On the other hand, firms with high investment opportunities have high M/B and R&D and might need to 
signal this through dividend for future need of capital (Pan, 2007). Our risk enhancing hypothesis suggests that with 
more director stock options the firm will need less signaling and more risky investments. All other relations of other 
variables are consistent with previous research. 
 
4.2  Regression analysis 
 
Results from the previous section indicate that firms with different payout strategies differ in their 
compensation plans; further, firms with different growth potential differ in their dividend payout and compensation 
plans. However, the outcome may be the result of other factors affecting the relations. For example, firms in 
different industries may have different payout, investment and compensation policies. Similarly, firms with different 
financial characteristics may have different perspectives about distributing dividends. Therefore, to test the 
robustness of the previous results, we employ a multivariate approach incorporating many of the relevant variables. 
We start with establishing the linear relation between dividend payout and compensation and investment policies. 
 
4.2.1  Director compensation and dividends 
 
To capture the association between dividends and director incentive pay and between dividends and M/B 
and R&D, we use the following regression equation:  
 
Dividend Ratio= B0 + B1 (Dir Inc) + B2 (M/B) + B3 (R&D) + B4 (Size) + B5(Leverage) + B6 (XS Cash) + B7 
(Return)+ B8 (Risk) +B9 (CEOChair) + B10(Tenure)  + B11 (Board) +B12 (Outsiders) +B13 (CEO Own) 
+B14 (Dir Own) + SIC Dummies + Year Dummies + e.   (2) 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the above Tobit regression model. We use variant measures of the dividend 
ratio; specifically, dividend to asset ratio (Div2A) in columns (2) and (3). We also add the lag of dividend to assets 
as aexplanatory variable to signify change in the dependent variable in columns (4) and (5); and dividend to earnings 
(payout) ratio in columns (6) and (7).
6
 Director incentive pay (Dir Inc) takes either of the two proxies: the five years 
accumulated director proportion of stock options (Dir PSO) or the pay for performance compensation of equity 
grants received in the recent five years (PyPerDir). Column (1) reports the direction of the relation expected between 
the explanatory variables and the dividend ratio.  In all columns, there seem to be a negative and significant relation 
between dividend distribution and director incentive pay. For example, in column (2), the coefficient on Dir PSO is 
negative and significant at 1% suggesting that outside directors prefer lower dividends the higher the proportion of 
stock options in their compensation. Further, a one standard deviation increase in Dir PSO translates into a decrease 
of 84 basis points in dividends, which is equivalent to more than 73% of the average ratio of dividend to assets 
                                                 
5 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) argue that firms with Tobin’s Q<1 are overinvestors. According to Easterbrook (1984) and 
Jensen (1986), managers, who are overinvesting, avoid dividends because it subjects the firm to future scrutiny from the new 
issue market. 
6 I also examine other proxies for payout like dividend yield and dividend to sales. The results of these regressions are not 
reported for brevity. Further, in all remaining tables I report results for dividend to assets.  
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(1.14%) over the sample period. The above result holds several interpretations. One interpretation is that firms that 
are short on cash restrict the distribution of dividends and simultaneously increase the non-cash (stock option) 
compensation for outside directors. Another interpretation is that firms with more stock option compensation to 
outside directors prefer taking on more investments than distributing dividends; the risk enhancing hypothesis. 
Finally, higher stock options for outside directors might reflect their power within the firm and retaining excess cash 
might be for personal benefits. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive; however, I examine each 




Tobit Regression with Industry Fixed Effect 
This table presents a Tobit model of dividends on director incentive pay and other explanatory variables.  The regression 
specification is similar to equation 2. The dependent variable is dividends to lagged total assets (columns 2 to 5) and dividends to 
earnings before extraordinary items (columns 6&7). For columns 6 & 7 the sample excludes observations with negative and zero 
earnings. All explanatory variables descriptions are similar to those in table 1. All regressions include industry and year 
dummies. p-values are in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent  Div2A Div2A Div2earn 
Lag Div2A + - - 0.8979 0.8843 - - 
  - - (0.00) (0.00) - - 
Dir PSO - -0.0165 - -0.0038 - -0.0191 - 
  (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) - 
PerPayDir - - -0.0007 - -0.0002 - -0.0005 
  - (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Size + 0.0011 0.0018 0.0012 0.0014 0.0020 0.0027 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
M/B ? 0.0012 0.0026 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0016 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.78) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage - -0.0173 -0.0184 -0.0072 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0086 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
XS Cash + 0.0887 0.0808 0.0178 0.0181 0.0468 0.0474 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D  - -0.0992 -0.0860 -0.0475 -0.0416 -0.1280 -0.1187 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return ? -0.0439 -0.0385 0.0141 0.0171 -0.0407 -0.0364 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk - -0.3501 -0.3414 -0.1323 -0.1328 -0.3586 -0.3647 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOChair - -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0004 
  (0.44) (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.88) (0.60) 
Tenure - -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.67) (0.96) (0.00) (0.04) 
Board - 0.0074 0.0070 0.0021 0.0020 0.0038 0.0040 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Outsiders + 0.0058 0.0058 0.0026 0.0029 0.0112 0.0109 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Own - -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.65) (0.41) (0.18) 
Dir Own - -0.0043 -0.0025 -0.0077 -0.0074 -0.0145 -0.0136 
  (0.68) (0.81) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) 
 
 
The coefficient on firm size is positive and significant in all columns consistent with the argument that 
large and well established firms have greater tendency to commit to paying dividends. The coefficient on leverage is 
also positive and significant. Since most leverage comes with protective covenant on the distribution of dividends 
the relation is consistent. The regressions in table 3 also include variables that proxy for dividend strategy. The 
coefficient on XS cash is positive and significant consistent with the excess cash hypothesis that firms with more 
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cash distribute more dividends. The coefficients on M/B in columns (1) and (2) are positive and significant in 
explaining the level of dividend to assets. In Columns (3) and (4) the coefficients on M/B are negative and 
significant in explaining the dividend payout. This result is consistent with the signaling effect whereby growth 
firms signal their future opportunities through dividends even though their level of income is pretty low. Consistent 
with or argument, coefficients on R&D are negative and significant in all columns. Coefficients on CEO tenure are 
negative and significant in level of payout suggesting that influential CEOs prefer lower dividends. As expected, 
firms with larger boards and boards with more outside directors increase and pay more dividends.  
 
Overall, the results in table 3 support the argument that dividends are greatly affected by stock option plans 
to directors. In addition, the results show that dividend policies are linked to investment policies in the firm through 
their relation to M/B and R&D. However, these results do not imply much about the involvement of corporate 
directors in setting dividend policy. In other words, do directors implement different dividend plans when 
compensated with stock options?  
 
4.2.2  Director stock options and the investment strategy  
 
According to the pecking order hypothesis firms with abundant investment opportunities prefer financing 
from internally generated funds; therefore these firms are expected to reduce dividends. On the other hand, firms 
that anticipate consistent future earnings pay higher dividends (Guay and Harford, 2000). In table 4 columns 1 to 4 
we include the interaction variable of M/B with director incentive pay (Dir Inc) and the interaction of R&D with Dir 
Inc. However, to better interpret the results of the interaction variables we create two dummy variables for M/B and 
R&D. MB and RD are dummies where each is equal 1 if M/B and R&D ratios above their means and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction variable of Dir Inc and MB is negative and significant; so is the 
interaction variable of RD with Dir Inc. These results suggest that directors who receive stock options are less 
interested in distributing dividends even when higher earnings are anticipated. The preference for investments over 
dividends may emerge from their tendency to increase firm risk and value. The relation implied from the interaction 
variables of Dir Inc and the proxies for investment opportunities provides supporting evidence to the risk enhancing 
hypothesis and suggests that firms paying director’s with more stock options are inclined towards riskier investment 
strategies. 
 
In columns 5 to 8 of table 4, we add CEO incentive pay as an independent variable and run the same tests 
as those in table 3 including the interaction of CEO incentive and the proxies for dividend policy (M/B and R&D). 
In columns (5) to (8) the coefficients on the interaction variables between Dir Inc and M/B are mostly negative and 
significant; whereas the results between CEO Inc and M/B is only significant in column (5). Further, the interaction 
of Dir Inc and R&D is significant at 1% in columns (5) and (6) whereas the coefficients on the interaction variable 
of CEO Inc and R&D are not significant. These results suggest that firms with abundant investment opportunities 
are more likely to reduce dividends to take advantage of these opportunities when directors are motivated with 
equity stock options. Such outcome implies that directors are likely to support riskier investment plans that reflect in 
lower safe bets (dividends) and more investments. On the other hand, the results in columns 5 to 8 of table 4 
regarding CEO effect on dividend distribution suggest that CEOs have relatively lower marginal effect on the firm’s 
payout strategy than directors. Indeed, the payout strategy in rules and regulations (see Delaware law article 144) is 
directly associated with board decision.  
 
Overall, the results in table 4 support the argument that outside directors are involved in setting dividend 
policy because it entails management and governance spillovers. However, observing the effect of directors in 
isolation from the effect of executives –specifically the CEO- provides an incomplete picture of the process of 
setting the dividend policy. Therefore, the following section examines the role of the CEO in the dividend 
distribution plan by including interaction variables of the CEO’s PSO and the surrogates for dividend strategies. The 
simultaneous use of CEO and director interaction variables allows for the examination of the struggle of power 
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Table 4 
Investment Hypothesis including CEO Inc 
This table presents a Tobit model of dividends on director incentive pay, CEO incentive pay, interaction variables and other 
explanatory variables. The regression specification is similar to equation 2 with the addition of interaction variables of Dir Inc 
(and CEO Inc) with M/B and RD in columns 1 to 4 (Columns 5 to 8. MB (RD) is an indicator variables that equal 1 if M/B (RD) 
is high – above the median- and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is dividends to lagged total assets. All explanatory 
variables descriptions are similar to those in table 1. All regressions include industry and year dummies. p-values are in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Div2A 
Lag Div2A - - 0.8942 0.8818 - 0.8885 - 0.8782 
 - - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Dir PSO -0.0082 - -0.0027 - -0.0057 -0.0022 - - 
 (0.00) - (0.02) - (0.00) (0.06) - - 
CEO PSO - - - - -0.0129 -0.0022 - - 
 - - - - (0.00) (0.14) - - 
PyPerDir - -0.0043 - -0.0010 - - -0.0036 -0.0009 
 - (0.00) - (0.00) - - (0.00) (0.00) 
PyPerCEO - - - - - - -0.0018 -0.0004 
 - - - - - - (0.00) (0.00) 
MB 0.0117 0.0098 0.0005 0.0011 0.0177 0.0014 0.0111 0.0014 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.03) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.01) 
RD -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0027 0.0008 -0.0039 -0.0007 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.67) (0.22) (0.13) (0.45) (0.00) (0.28) 
Size 0.0009 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0022 0.0014 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.0142 -0.0161 -0.0055 -0.0064 -0.0123 -0.0053 -0.0148 -0.0061 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
XS Cash 0.0684 0.0694 0.0116 0.0126 0.0670 0.0115 0.0691 0.0128 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return -0.0431 -0.0236 0.0124 0.0187 -0.0312 0.0146 -0.0132 0.0208 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.21) (0.00) 
Risk -0.3614 -0.3512 -0.1493 -0.1465 -0.3505 -0.1488 -0.3493 -0.1469 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOChair -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 (0.48) (0.35) (0.15) (0.12) (0.93) (0.28) (0.87) (0.22) 
Tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.71) (0.87) (0.01) (0.72) (0.05) (0.87) 
Board 0.0071 0.0070 0.0021 0.0020 0.0070 0.0021 0.0069 0.0020 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Outsiders 0.0066 0.0071 0.0026 0.0029 0.0073 0.0027 0.0081 0.0031 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
CEO Own -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.54) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00) (0.74) 
Dir Own -0.0043 -0.0026 -0.0065 -0.0068 -0.0075 -0.0071 -0.0054 -0.0074 
 (0.67) (0.80) (0.28) (0.27) (0.45) (0.24) (0.60) (0.24) 
Dir Inc * MB -0.0114 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0122 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.06) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.04) 
Dir Inc * RD -0.0082 -0.0002 -0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0080 -0.0037 -0.0002 -0.0006 
 (0.00) (0.81) (0.01) (0.36) (0.00) (0.01) (0.61) (0.36) 
CEO Inc * MB - - - - -0.0088 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 - - - - (0.01) (0.66) (0.39) (0.44) 
CEO Inc * RD - - - - -0.002 -0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0006 
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4.2.3  Director Stock Options and Opportunistic Behavior 
 
An alternative interpretation for firms with director stock option compensation reducing the distribution of 
dividends from excess cash is that outside directors use excess cash for personal benefits. In other words, in 
collaboration with management directors prefer investing excess cash in pet projects. In order to test whether or not 
outside directors opportunistically reduce dividends, the sample is divided into two groups according to M/B; firms 
with M/B<1 and firms with M/B≥1. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use this approach to separate overinvesting firms 
(M/B<1) from firms that take value-maximizing investments (M/B≥1). Overinvesting firms take negative net 
present value projects that probably benefit management (and directors) but not shareholders. Estimations using 
equation (2) are obtained for both groups.   Table 5 reports the results of the tests. The results show that the relation 
between excess cash and Dir PSO is significant only in the sample where M/B>1. This suggests that reduction in the 
distribution of dividends from excess cash when outside directors receive more stock options is associated with 
value-maximizing firms (M/B≥1). This outcome provides an evidence to reject the hypothesis that director stock 
options promote opportunistic behavior in favor of the hypothesis that director stock options improve monitoring. 
 
Table 5 
Opportunistic Behavior Hypothesis 
This table presents a Tobit model of dividends on director incentive pay using two subsamples divided according to M/B. 
Columns 1 & 2 present results using equation 2 for the sample with M/B below the median. Columns 3 and 4 present results 
using equation 2 for the sample with M/B above the median All explanatory variables descriptions are similar to those in table 1. 
All regressions include industry and year dummies. p-values are in brackets. The sample and variable description are presented in 
table 1. p-values are in brackets. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  M/B<1 M/B>1 
Dependent  Div2A 
Dir PSO  -0.0039 - -0.0099 - 
  (0.19) - (0.00) - 
PerPayDir  - -0.0016 - -0.0045 
  - (0.09) - (0.00) 
MB  -0.0059 -0.0064 0.0110 0.0096 
  (0.19) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
RD  -0.0060 -0.0068 -0.0024 -0.0030 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) 
Size  -0.0002 0.0002 0.0010 0.0017 
  (0.71) (0.73) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage  -0.0050 -0.0078 -0.0166 -0.0185 
  (0.31) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) 
XS Cash  0.0331 0.0341 0.0643 0.0653 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Return  0.0477 0.0545 -0.0580 -0.0371 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk  -0.1603 -0.1545 -0.3837 -0.3715 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOChair  -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0005 
  (0.21) (0.29) (0.69) (0.49) 
Tenure  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.01) (0.06) 
Board  0.0052 0.0053 0.0067 0.0066 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Outsiders  0.0042 0.0038 0.0067 0.0073 
  (0.21) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO Own  -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  (0.92) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dir Own  -0.0294 -0.0243 -0.0031 -0.0011 
  (0.28) (0.37) (0.76) (0.91) 
Dir Inc * MB  -0.0079 -0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0003 
  (0.39) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dir Inc * RD  -0.0080 -0.0007 -0.0074 -0.006 
  (0.13) (0.18) (0.00) (0.82) 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the validity of the claim that stock options for outside directors improve board 
decision-making because it aligns the interests of shareholders and directors. In addition, it examines whether the 
increase in the convexity of director pay provides an incentive to act opportunistically. The tests are conducted with 
an eye on investment and payout policies. 
 
The major finding of the paper is that stock options to outside directors are associated with greater appetite 
for risky investments. The inference from these findings is that director stock options provide a financial motive for 
outside directors to be more involved in decision making within the firm. 
 
Particularly, the paper examines the effect of stock option compensation for outside directors on dividend 
and investment policies. The paper indicates that directors become more involved in corporate decisions when 
compensated with stock options. Specifically, director’s stock options seem to encourage investment (risky) over 
dividends (safe) suggesting that firms follow a riskier investment strategy when stock option plans are adopted. 
 
Since director compensation is relatively small relative to CEO compensation the paper also examines 
whether the observed effect on investments disappears when the effect of CEO stock options are incorporated. In 
essence, the paper investigates whether the effect of stock options to outside directors is over shadowed by the effect 
of CEO stock options. We find that stock option grants to CEOs do not alter the effect of director stock options on 
the investment policy. Finally, this paper sheds light on the drastic changes happening in the governance structure of 
the firm. It provides evidence that corporate directors are becoming more involved in decision making. Future 
research should be directed towards the substitution effect between financial and reputational concerns of corporate 
directors. Should director compensation plans discriminate directors who serve on investment committees from 
those who serve on other committees (e.g. auditing committees)? Is the distribution of power among the several 
players (directors, the CEO and the other executives) a developing trend in the financial market and how is this 
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